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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the costs of rearing children have become astronomical.
Many people simply cannot afford to have the number of children
they might otherwise want. Consequently, many use birth control;
however, most birth control methods do not provide 100 percent cer-
tainty against pregnancy. Thus, some people seek more drastic proce-
dures that they believe will completely eliminate the possibility of
pregnancy.
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Medical procedures exist that allow both men and women the op-
portunity to be sterilized. However, sometimes sterilization is not suc-
cessful, and the woman becomes pregnant with a child that the
parents believed would never be conceived due to the sterilization.
Faced with the prospect of financial crisis due to the unexpected child,
the parents may sue the physician who performed the sterilization
procedure.
"Wrongful birth" or "wrongful pregnancy" actions are generally
synonymous terms for a type of medical malpractice involving a physi-
cian's negligent performance of a sterilization procedure.' In this
cause of action, the patient and his or her spouse sue the physician for
costs associated with the childbirth, pain and suffering (both physical
and psychological), and sometimes the costs of raising the child until
he or she reaches the age of majority.2 This action must be distin-
guished from a claim of "wrongful life," which is brought in the name
of, and on behalf of, the newborn child and seeks damages for the
child's unwanted existence. The vast majority of courts have rejected
such "wrongful life" claims.3
1. Commentators are divided on which term is appropriate. For various viewpoints,
see generally J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY § 221.2, at 323 (Cum. Supp. 1989);
DeVries, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Pregnancy: Judicial
Divergence on the Birth-Related Torts, 20 FORUM 207 (1985); Note, Wrongful
Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 40 U. CiN. L. REv. 65 (1981). This Note
focuses specifically on sterilization, however, the principles discussed herein
would also apply to other physician-assisted means of birth control.
The subject of wrongful pregnancy has generated a plethora of law review
articles. For discussions of various approaches to wrongful pregnancy, see gener-
ally Clinite, Wrongful Birth. The Appropriate Measure of Damages, 70 ILL. B. J.
772 (1982). Zaslow, Wrongful Conception, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Life:
The Perameters of Liability, 10 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRACTICE 5 (1982); Note,
Parents in Wrongful Birth Action Are Entitled to Recover the Extraordinary Ex-
penses of Raising a Defective Child to Age of Majority but Are Not Entitled to
Recover Ordinary Expenses of Rearing a Normal or Defective Child--Ramey v.
Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 312
(1982); Comment, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays for Bringing Up Baby?, 47
FORDHAM L. REv. 418 (1978); Recent Developments, Tort Law: Wrongful Birth
and Wrongful Life Actions-Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 11. 2d
230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987), 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859 (1988); Case Comment,
Tort Law-Wrongful Birth. Public Policy Precludes Award of Child Rearing
Costs-Kingsbury v. Smith, 441 A. 2d 1003 (N.H. 1982), 17 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 280
(1983); Recent Development, To Be or Not To Be: The Pennsylvania General As-
sembly Eliminates Wrongful Birth and Life Actions, 34 ViLL. L. REv. 681 (1989).
2. See infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., EUiott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764
P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988)(en banc); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1981);
Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen.
Hosp. 117 I. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245,
718 P.2d 635 (1986); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. 517 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 1987),
writ granted, 519 So. 2d 105 (La. 1987); Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics &
Gynecology, 122 Mich. App. 116, 332 N.W.2d 432 (1982); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H.
[Vol. 70:361
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
The majority of courts addressing wrongful pregnancy claims have
held that the plaintiffs have a valid cause of action, and consequently
courts have awarded the traditional tort remedies of general and spe-
cial damages relating to actual medical services incident to the birth
and delivery, but not the costs of raising the child.4 Thus, the contro-
versy in recent cases has been over awarding childrearing costs. Sev-
eral courts have departed from the majority and have awarded these
damages.5
Burke v. Rivo 6 is the latest in this relatively new line of cases. The
Burke court held that in addition to recovering all costs associated
with the birth, the parents were entitled to recover from the physician
the costs of raising their child, offset against the benefits received by
the parents of having their child.7 This Note examines the Burke
court's decision to allow childrearing damages, pointing out its
strengths and weaknesses, and suggests that other courts generally
follow Burke but with some major additions.
Part II begins the Note with a discussion of the Burke opinions. It
outlines the facts of the Burke case, discusses the majority's allowance
of childrearing damages, and concludes with a discussion of the dis-
sent's concern over a potential negative impact of such an award on
the child.
Part III notes the three major theories used by courts to deny
231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985),
cert denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Ellis v. Sherman, 512 Pa. 14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986);
Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). But see Turpin v. Sortini 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643
P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
4. See eg., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.
239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C.
App. 1984); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 M1. 2d 193,447 N.E.2d 385 (1983); Schork
v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422
N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484,453 A.2d 974 (1982);
Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987).
5. See, eg., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579,585,667 P.2d 1294,1297-99 (1983); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 708-09,
127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59 (1976); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463,477 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253,259-60,445 A.2d 883, 886
(1982); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 11. App. 3d 271, 273-74, 425 N.E.2d 968, 970
(1981), rev'd, 95 IlM. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983); Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764,
772, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1990); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257,187 N.W.2d 511,
519 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175-76 (Minn. 1977);
Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (1990). But cf.
Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Colo. 1988)(limiting award of chil-
drearing damages to cases where child is abnormal). See generally J. STEIN,
supra note 1, § 221.4, at 330 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
6. 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
7. Id. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6.
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childrearing expenses. These theories are the overriding benefit the-
ory, the adverse effect on the child theory, and the speculative dam-
ages theory. The Note concludes that each of these theories is without
merit.
Part IV focuses on a two-part rule used by some courts to offset the
damage award against the benefits of parenthood. The Note concludes
that this benefit rule with its same interest limitation, if properly ap-
plied, can operate to make fair recoveries possible.
Part V is devoted to discussing whether courts should consider the
availability of abortion and/or adoption as potential reducers of dam-
ages. While recognizing that not everyone considers abortion or adop-
tion as viable alternatives to parenthood, the Note concludes that
because both abortion and adoption are legal alternatives in many ju-
risdictions, courts in those states must consider them in their damages
analyse.
Part VI discusses a method for determining what interest the par-
ents sought to prevent by undergoing a sterilization procedure. Such a
"motivational analysis" is crucial in the wrongful pregnancy context
since, as the Note points out, it is a fair and equitable method for prop-
erly ascertaining the correct amount of damages.
Part VII is the Note's conclusion. It provides a summary and re-
view of the Note's important points.
II. BURKE V. RIVO 8
A. Facts
In December 1983, Carole Burke met with her physician, Elliot
Rivo, M.D., to discuss her desire not to have additional children. The
Burkes were suffering financial difficulties, and Mrs. Burke wanted to
return to work. According to the Burkes, Dr. Rivo recommended Mrs.
Burke undergo a bioplar cauterization9 procedure and that Dr. Rivo
guaranteed Mrs. Burke would not become pregnant again.O Thus, in
February 1984, Dr. Rivo performed a laparoscopic bilateral tubal liga-
tion by bipolar cauterization.'" On June 25, 1985, a pregnancy test con-
firmed Mrs. Burke was pregnant. Subsequently, on February 12,1986,
she gave birth to her fourth healthy child, and the next day she under-
went a second sterilization operation known as a bilateral salpingec-
8. 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
9. A bipolar cauterization involves burning the fallopian tubes. See DORLAND'S IL-
LUSTRATED MEDICAL DICIONARY 170, 232 (26th ed. 1981) [hereinafter DOR-
LAND'S] (combination of separate definitions of "bipolar" and "cauterization").
10. Brief for Appellant at 3, Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
11. The procedure would have involved constricting the fallopian tubes with liga-
tures and then burning them so that the tubes become severed. See DoRLAND'S,
supra note 9, at 743 (definition of "ligation" and "tubal 1.").
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tomy.12 Laboratory reports revealed that following the first
operation, there had be a recanalization13 of Mrs. Burke's left fallo-
pian tube. The Burkes alleged that if Dr. Rivo had explained to Mrs.
Burke the risk of recanalization associated with the original proce-
dure, however small, she would initially have chosen a different and
more certain sterilization procedure.14
The Burkes sought recovery for emotional distress sustained as a
result of the unwanted pregnancy, other damages directly associated
with the birth, and the costs of raising their child.15 The trial judge
reported the question concerning the proper measure of damages to
the state appeals court and the case was subsequently transferred to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.' 6 Specifically, the trial
judge's question was:
The question of the proper measure of damages recoverable by the parents of
a normal, healthy child who was conceived and born (1) following the defend-
ant physician's alleged negligent performance of a sterilization procedure on
the mother, and (2) following the physician's alleged guarantee that the steril-
ization procedure would prevent any future pregnancy.17
The trial court was seeking rules of law to be applied to the facts of
the Burke's case because there was no prior Massachusetts decision
addressing this question. Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts had to determine whether recovery of childrearing costs was
permissible in wrongful pregnancy cases. A discussion of the majority
and dissenting opinions follows.
B. Majority Opinion
The majority held that the proper measure of damages included
the costs incident to the birth, including emotional distress, and the
costs of rearing the child if the Burkes' reason for seeking sterilization
was based on economic or financial considerations.' 8 However, the
court further held that the consequences of the physician's negligence,
including childrearing costs, could be offset against the current and
future benefits the Burkes enjoyed by having the child.19
The court's ruling that the Burkes could recover all damages "di-
rectly associated with the birth (sometimes including damages for par-
12. A bilateral salpingectomy involves the excision of both uterine tubes. See
BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 170, 1214 (4th ed. 1979)(combination
of separate definitions of "bilateral" and "salpingectomy").
13. Recanalization involves the re-forming of channels, here the fallopian tubes. See
DORLAND'S, supra note 9, at 211 (definition of "canalization").
14. Brief for Appellant at 4, Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
15. Id. at 7-8.
16. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 764-65, 551 N.E.2d 1, 1-2 (1990).
17. Id.




ents' emotional distress)"2 0 was in harmony with the majority of
jurisdictions that have considered the issue.2 ' However, the court's
holding that childrearing expenses were also recoverable was previ-
ously adopted by only a substantial minority of other courts.22
C. Dissent
The dissenters disagreed with the majority over awarding chil-
drearing costs.23 Joining the majority of other jurisdictions which
have denied childrearing costs, the dissenters stated that public policy
precluded such an award. Specifically, the dissenters argued that pub-
lic policy precluded recognizing a child's life as a loss,24 and that
awarding childrearing costs would have potentially adverse effects on
children and families.25
III. THEORIES DENYING RECOVERY FOR CHILDREARING
EXPENSES: SHOULD THEY BE FOLLOWED?
Normal tort principles require awarding childrearing costs where
the plaintiff establishes liability.26 These costs are reasonably foresee-
able and/or natural and probable consequences of the physician's neg-
ligence.27 Thus, the only basis for denying or limiting these
traditional damages must be on public policy grounds.28
Three theories have been used by other courts to justify their deci-
sions that childrearing costs should not be awarded: (1) the overriding
benefit theory, (2) the adverse effect on the child theory, and (3) the
speculative damages theory. The Burke court rejected each of these
theories in determining that childrearing costs were properly
awarded.29 Each theory is discussed below.
A. The Overriding Benefit Theory
Courts embracing the overriding benefit theory hold that the bene-
fit conferred on parents by a child (many courts require a healthy,
20. Id. at 766, 551 N.E.2d at 3.
21. See cases cited supra notes 4-5.
22. See cases cited supra note 5.
23. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 773, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1990).
24. Id. at 775, 551 N.E.2d at 7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 769, 551 N.E.2d at 4. The Burke court also discussed contract principles,
specifically noting that Dr. Rivo could be held liable for breach of guarantee. Id.
at 766-767, 551 N.E.2d at 2-3. However, this Note is limited to discussing tort law,
and thus will focus on that part of the Burke decision.
27. Other courts have failed to recognize childrearing costs as reasonably foreseeable
and/or probable consequences of the physician's negligence. See cases cited supra
note 4.
28. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 769, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1990).
29. Id. at 769-71, 551 N.E.3d at 4-6.
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normal child) outweighs any injury the parents may have incurred as
a matter of law.3 0 In rejecting this theory, the Burke court stated that
it "simply lacks verisimilitude."3' When an individual has sought med-
ical intervention to keep from having a child, that person has unequiv-
ocally shown that for him or her, the benefits of parenthood did not
outweigh the burdens of having a child.32
Furthermore, public policy does not favor a notion that the birth of
an unplanned, albeit healthy child, results in no damage to its parents
or that any damage is outweighed by the benefits as a matter of law.33
For example, contraceptive methods are used every day to prevent the
birth of healthy children. To have a rule saying that for reasons of
public policy contraceptive failure results in no damage as a matter of
law ignores the fact that millions of people use contraceptives daily.34
The conduct of those millions is surely indicative of community senti-
ment, which is the foundation of public policy.
B. The Adverse Effect on the Child Theory
Another theory used to disallow recovery for childrearing costs
posits that some day the child might be adversely affected by learning
he or she was unwanted and that someone else paid his or her ex-
penses.3 5 The Burke court noted that, "Courts expressing concern
30. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718,722-23 (ALa. 1982)(restricted to nor-
eal healthy child); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 13-14 (Del. Super. 1975)(re-
stricted to normal healthy child); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823-24, (Fla.
1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084,1085 (Fla. 1980)(restricted to
normal healthy child); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653,655-
56 (Ga. 1984); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 2d 51, 62, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487
(1979)(restricted to normal healthy child); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862
(Ky. 1983)(restricted to normal healthy child); Maggard v. McKelway, 627 S.W.2d
44,47 (Ky. App. 1981); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484,487,453 A.2d 974,
976 (1982); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934)
(earliest case found; restricted to normal healthy child); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, 432, 404 A.2d 8,14 (1979)(restricted to normal healthy child); Weintraub v.
Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 348-49, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1983); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73
A.D.2d 724,726,422 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509 (1979)(restricted to normal healthy child);
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973), cervt denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974) (restricted to normal healthy child); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64
Wis. 2d 514, 518 n.6, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 n.6 (1974)(restricted to normal healthy
child).
31. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 769, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1990)(citation omitted).
32. Id.
33. Brief for Appellant at 15, Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E2dl (1990).
34. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
35. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 770, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (citation omitted). See, eg.,
Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982); University of Ariz. Health
Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579,592,667 P.2d 1294,1302 (1983)(en
banc)(Gordon, V.C.J., dissenting); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W2d
568, 571 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 14 (Del. 1975); McKernan v.
Asheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 417, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (1984).
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about the effect on the child nevertheless allow the parents to recover
certain direct expenses from the negligent physician without expres-
sing concern about harm to the child when the child learns that he or
she was unwanted."36 In fact, the once unwanted child's knowledge
that someone other than the parents had paid for his or her upbring-
ing may alleviate the child's distress at the knowledge of having once
been unwanted.37
Furthermore, this fear of an adverse effect on the child is predi-
cated on the tenuous assumption that the child is in fact "damage." To
the contrary, "[t]he allowance of rearing costs is not an aspersion upon
the value of the child's life ... [but] is instead a recognition of the
importance of the parents' fundamental right to control their repro-
ductivity."38 In other words, the child itself is not "damage," rather it
is the cost of raising the child, which is the reasonably foreseeable con-
sequence of the physician's negligence, that is the damage.
C. The Speculative Damages Theory
A final theory used to disallow childrearing damages is that they
are too speculative or are unreasonably disproportionate to the physi-
cian's negligence.3 9 Rejecting this theory as well, the Burke court
stated that, "[t]he determination of the anticipated costs of child-rear-
ing [sic] is no more complicated or fanciful than many calculations of
future losses made every day in tort cases." 40 For example, if a physi-
cian negligently cares for a newborn child, damage calculations would
be performed regarding the newborn's earning capacity and expected
medical expenses over the child's lifetime. Furthermore, childrearing
expenses should be no more difficult to calculate than damages for
pain and suffering or mental anguish, and population studies are read-
ily available to provide figures for childrearing costs. 41
36. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 770, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1990)(citation omitted).
37. Id. at 770, 551 N.E.2d at 4-5.
38. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 273, 425 N.E.2d 968, 970 (1981),
rev'd, 95 1. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983), cert denied sub. nom, Raja v. Michael
Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 464 U.S. 846 (1983). See also Rivera v. New York, 94
Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978)(stating "[W]here a physi-
i dan's negligence results in the birth of an unwanted child, a substantial interfer-
ence with the fundamental rights of the parent occurs, which may well have
catastrophic financial consequences."). See generally Comment, Wrongful Life:
Birth Control Spawns a Tort, 13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 401 (1980).
39. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 771, 551 N.E.2d 1, 5 (citation omitted). See e.g.,
Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d
861, 863 (Ky. 1983); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973);
James G. v. Caserta, 322 S.W.2d 872,878 (W.Va. 1985); Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co., 46 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650
P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
40. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 771, 551 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1990).
41. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 66, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1990). See also
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IV. OFFSETTING CHILDREARING EXPENSES AGAINST THE
BENEFITS OF HAVING A CHILD
A number of courts holding childrearing costs recoverable have
recognized that children add a great deal to their parents' lives, and
therefore have offset the damage award against these benefits.42 The
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,261,187 N.W.2d 511,520-21 (191)(holding cost
of childrearing is a computation routinely performed in countless cases), leave to
appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 129 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973)(Cadena, J., dissenting)(complicated damages occur in many
cases), cert denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974). Many sources exist relating to computa-
tion of childrearing expenses. See generally Ciecka Estimating the Costs of Chil-
dren in Wrongful Birth Cases, 28 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 297 (1984); Franz,
Calculating Damages in Wrongful Pregnancy Cases, in The Practical Lawyer's
Manual on Pretrial Preparations, 165, 166-67 (1985)(discussing U.S.D.A. study of
costs of childbearing); Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishan-
dling by Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL U.L. REv. 127, 152 n.170 (1978)(table provided by
Population Reference Bureau giving costs of childraising in 1977).
Regarding the speculative damages argument, Nebraska courts have long al-
lowed triers of fact to make difficult damages calculations in wrongful death
cases. See, e-g., Crewdson v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 234 Neb. 631, 64345, 452
N.W.2d 270 (1990)(holding in action for wrongful death of child of majority age
damages may be recovered for loss of contributions reasonably expected to be
made by child, and for the loss of society, comfort, and companionship of the
child); Garvin v. Coover, 202 Neb. 582,586-87,276 N.W.2d 225,227-28 (1979)(hold-
ing damages for loss of society, comfort, and companionship resulting from
wrongful death of child being by their very nature problematical, the amount is
peculiarly for jury to determine); Caradori v. Fitch, 200 Neb. 186,194,263 N.W2d
649, 655 (1978)(holding measure of damages for wrongful death of minor child
includes loss of society, comfort, and companionship of child); Selders v. Armen-
trout, 192 Neb. 291,292-93,220 N.W.2d 222,223-24 (1974)(holding amount of dam-
ages for wrongful death of minor child is difficult to estimate and is peculiarly
within the province of jury to determine); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Selders, 187 Neb. 343,345-46,190 N.W.2d 789,791 (1971)(holding measure of dam-
ages in action for wrongful death of minor child is the pecuniary loss which par-
ent sustains by reason of being deprived of the child's services throughout his
minority and the loss of contributions reasonably expected to be made after
reaching majority). Therefore, it would be illogical for Nebraska courts to ex-
dude childrearing expenses on the pretext that those amounts would be too diffi-
cult to ascertain. In fact, some courts have specifically analogized wrongful
pregnancy with wrongful death damages. See, eg., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d
1544, 1552 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); Sherlock v. Still-
water Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
42. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579,585,667 P.2d1294, 1297-99 (1983); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698,708-09,
127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59 (1976); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 259-60, 445 A.2d
883, 886 (1982); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255,187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175-76 (Minn. 1977). But see Cus-
todio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303,325,59 Cal. Rptr. 463,477 (1967)(no offset for
benefits); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 m. App. 3d 271,273-74,425 N.E.2d 968,970
(1981), rev'd, 95 M11. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983)(same). This type of offset ap-
pears to be a recognition that although the overriding benefit theory goes too far
in stating the benefits of having a child outweigh all damage, some benefit may
exist to offset part of the cost. However, a number of courts have ruled out such
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Burke court followed these cases and ruled that any benefits Mr. and
Mrs. Burke received from having their child must be offset against
their damage award.43
The basis for this offset comes from the "benefit rule" set out in
section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,44 which states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to
his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of
the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered
in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.4 5
Facially, the Burke court appears to have correctly applied the ben-
efit rule. However, the court failed to fully address the "same inter-
est" limitation contained in comment b.46 Specifically, the same
interest limitation states that "[d]amages resulting from an invasion of
one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest has
benefited."47
Applied to the wrongful pregnancy context, the same interest limi-
tation requires an identification of the interest a plaintiff sought to
protect in attempting to avoid conception, and a determination of
whether a special benefit to that interest was conferred upon the
plaintiff as a result of the physician's negligent conduct.48 While the
Burke court identified the interest the Burkes sought to protect by
sterilization, namely the economic stability of their family, the court's
failure to adequately recognize the effect of the same interest limita-
tion is apparent in its broad pronouncement that, "[t]he trier of fact
should offset against the cost of rearing the child the benefit, if any,
the parents received and will receive from having their child."49
recovery altogether on the theory that it is exceedingly difficult to weigh the in-
tangible benefits of a healthy baby against the cold economic burden of raising
the baby to adulthood. J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 221.4, at 330-31 (Cum. Supp.
1989)(listing numerous cases).
43. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 772, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1990).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
45. Id.
46. Id. at comment b.
47. Id.
48. Note, Recovery of Childrearing Expenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A Motiva-
tional Analysis, 32 EMORY L.J. 1167, 1180 (1983).
49. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 772, 551 N.E. 1, 6 (1990)(footnote omitted). Other
courts have differed on how to apply the same interest limitation. For a broad
reading of the same interest limitation, see, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.
240,255,187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971)(holding it would be unsound to separate non-
economic damage from economic damage of unplanned child in applying the
same interest rule), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Sherlock v. Still-
water Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977)(holding trier of fact must reduce
award of childrearing expenses by the value of the child's aid, comfort, and soci-
ety which will benefit the parents for the duration of their lives). For a narrow
reading of the same interest limitation, see, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.
2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967)(holding offsetting benefit must be to the
interest protected); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 11. App. 3d 271, 274, 425 N.E.2d
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A correct application of the benefit rule and same interest limita-
tion requires the trier of fact to first determine the interest sought to
be protected. This interest identification is best done through a "moti-
vational analysis." 50 Then, any benefit conferred upon that interest
by the physician's negligence may be set off from the damage award,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary. Such an approach is far more
likely to attain an equitable damage award, from both the plaintiff's
and defendant's perspectives, than either an overly broad or overly
narrow application of the benefits rule and same interest limitation.
For example, a broad interpretation of the same interest limitation
would allow prenatal pecuniary costs to be offset by postnatal nonpe-
cuniary benefits of parenthood, resulting in a potentially significant, if
not unfair, reduction in the plaintiff's recoverable damages.51 On the
other hand, a narrow reading of the limitation would not allow for the
offsetting of pecuniary interests with nonpecuniary interests, and as
such may provide a windfall to the plaintiff.52 Thus, the best approach
for a court to take in determining whether the physician's negligent
conduct has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, is to focus its analysis on discerning exactly what
interest the plaintiff sought to protect by undergoing the sterilization
operation.m
V. IS ABORTION OR ADOPTION AN OPTION?
Many women become pregnant each year and decide to either ter-
minate their pregnancy or give their children up for adoption. Rather
than seeking child support from unwed fathers, for instance, mothers
may decide not to incur childrearing expenses by giving the baby up
for adoption or aborting the fetus. Similarly, couples whose birth con-
trol does not work may not sue the pharmaceutical company, for ex-
ample, but instead decide to handle the situation themselves. Why
then, should the parents of an unplanned child be able to collect dam-
968, 970 (1981)(holding the rewards of parenthood should not be allowed to miti-
gate childrearing costs because they are emotional in nature and do nothing to
benefit the plaintiff's injured financial interests), rev'd, 95 M. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2
385 (1983), cert denied sub. nom., Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Center,
464 U.S. 846 (1983).
50. The "motivational analysis" originates in Note, supra note 48, and is discussed
infra beginning at Part VI.
51. Note, supra note 48, at 1181. See, e-g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721
(Ala. 1982)(Faulkner, J., concurring specially)(broad interpretation of benefit
rule and same interest limitation); University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v.
Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 586, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (1983)(broad interpre-
tation of benefit rule and same interest limitation). See also cases cited supra
note 49.
52. Note, supra note 48, at 1182. For cases giving a narrow reading to the same inter-
est limitation, see cases cited supra note 49.
53. Id. at 1183 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977)).
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ages from a physician who performed the failed sterilization proce-
dure when they could have avoided the financial burdens associated
with childrearing by considering the options of abortion or adoption?
The "avoidable consequences doctrine" set forth in section 918 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts54 states that, "[o]ne injured by the
tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he
could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure af-
ter commission of the tort."55 Although the Burke court did not ex-
pressly reject the doctrine, rejection can be inferred from the court's
statement that, "[w]e also firmly reject any suggestion that the availa-
bility of abortion or of adoption furnishes a basis for limiting damages
payable by a physician but for whose negligence the child would not
have been conceived.. .,"56 since applied to wrongful pregnancy cases,
"avoidance of substantial harm can be effectuated in two ways, either
by aborting the fetus within legally prescribed time limits or by plac-
ing the child for adoption."57
A number of other courts have specifically addressed the avoidable
consequences doctrine in the wrongful pregnancy context and held
that foregoing abortion or adoption should not be a factor in evaluat-
ing the plaintiff's damages,58 while still others have held the doctrine
applicable.59 Those courts which refused to consider the abortion or
54. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977).
55. Id.
56. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 770, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1990).
57. Note, supra note 48, at 1184.
58. See e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz.
579,586 n.5, 667 P.2d 1294,1301 n.5 (1983); Morris v. Freudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d
23,31,185 Cal. Rptr. 76,80 (1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257,274,473 A.2d
429, 437-38 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520
(1971), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); Rivera v. New York, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162-63,404
N.Y.S.2 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354,
370,428 A.2d 1366, 1376 (1981)(Brosky, J., concurring), modiied, 499 Pa. 484, 453
A.2d 974 (1982); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751-52 (Tenn. 1987); Marciniak v.
Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 69, 450 N.W.2d 243, 247-48 (1990). See generally J.
STEIN, supra note 1, § 221.8, at 339-40.
59. See, eg., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 728 (Ala. 1982)(Jones and Shore,
J.J., concurring specially) "Inherent in the mother's decision to carry the child to
full term... is her decision to rear the child."); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d
757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) "[Tlhis Court does not find it reasonable for a de-
fendant to be assessed damages representing support for a child when the plain-
tiffs choose to raise the child even where other lawful alternatives are
available.... In so doing, plaintiff-parents are thus indicating that the benefits
... outweigh any hardship or expense incident to the raising of the child."), aff'd,
349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Ziemba v. Steinberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 234, 357 N.Y.S.2d
265, 270 (1974)(Cordamore, J., dissenting) "[S]ince a legal abortion was an option
still available at that time, failure to [make use of] this legal alternative should
operate to bar [plaintiff's] present claim for damages."). See generally J. STEiN,
supra note 1, § 221.8, at 340 (citing two cases).
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adoption alternatives ignored fundamental tort law principles. For
example, writing in the mid-1930s Professor McCormick stated that,
"[a]ny suffering or disability incurred by one who has sustained per-
sonal injury, when the same could have been avoided by submitting to
treatment by a physician selected with reasonable care, must be ex-
cluded as a ground of recovery. '6"
Furthermore, applying the avoidable consequences doctrine in its
proper form would not necessarily, or as a matter of law, require the
trier of fact to dismiss the plaintiff's claim to childrearing damages
because the plaintiff refused abortion or adoption. The Restatement
(Second)'s version of the doctrine clearly states that the plaintiff's
damages are to be reduced only if he or she could have taken reason-
able steps to avoid injury.6 1 Thus, under the avoidable consequences
doctrine, if a plaintiff chooses to raise the child, she must bear the
financial burden that goes with this choice, but only if the trier of fact
were to find such a result reasonable and equitable. To label such a
requirement as "judicial coercion," effectively forcing the plaintiff to
abort or place her child up for adoption, would be inaccurate. In fact,
the doctrine only places upon the plaintiff the burden of making a
choice, the reasonableness of which would be determined later by the
trier of fact.62 Such a case-by-case determination of whether it would
have been "reasonable in the circumstances" for the plaintiff to have
avoided increasing her injury is what the avoidable consequences doc-
trine contemplates.63
By necessity then, whether the trier of fact considers abortion or
adoption reasonable will depend on the facts of the particular case. In
that regard, one court recognized that, "[w]here ethical or religious
scruples prevent a plaintiff from submitting to... surgery, the trier of
60. C. McCoRIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAxiAGES § 36, at 136 (1935).
Although McCormick continued by stating, "[ift is held, however, that the victim
may use his own judgment about submitting to a dangerous or serious opera-
tion.. ." id., using this statement to justify a rule precluding consideration of
abortion would be incorrect. Apparently, Professor McCormick was concerned
that a person not be required to undergo a medical treatment that could be con-
sidered dangerous or serious in terms of risk for that person. Yet the wide-spread
use of abortion by the American public creates a strong inference that for many,
if not most, women a properly performed abortion is not a particularly dangerous
medical procedure. Thus, consistent with this Note's analysis, whether abortion
was a reasonable alternative to continued pregnancy and subsequent childbirth
for any particular person is a question for the trier of fact. See infr notes 61-63
and accompanying text.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977)(emphasis added). See also C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 60, § 35, at 133 (stating only reasonable steps to minimize
injury are required).
62. Note, supra note 48, at 1187.
63. Note, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable Fort the Wrongful Birth of a




fact may consider these scruples as part of the circumstances which
bear upon the reasonableness of his conduct."64 Thus, the doctrine
provides for all situations which might arise in wrongful birth cases.
For example, plaintiffs opposed to abortion on moral or religious
grounds can take comfort in knowing their convictions will be consid-
ered in the trier of fact's assessment of the reasonableness of their
choice not to avail themselves of one mitigating method.65 Con-
versely, some plaintiffs may not indicate any moral or religious un-
willingness to have an abortion.66 Ultimately, however, since abortion
is legal in most states, it would be illogical not to consider it as an
element of mitigation in those jurisdictions.67
VI. DISCERNING THE INTEREST SOUGHT TO BE
PROTECTED
What interests of the parents are harmed by the doctor's negligent
performance? In answering this question, the Burke court focused on
the parents' motivation in attempting to avoid childbirth:
If the parents' desire to avoid the birth of a child was founded on eugenic
reasons (avoidance of a feared genetic defect) or was founded on therapeutic
reasons (concern for the mother's health) and if a healthy normal baby is
born, the justification for allowing recovery of the costs of rearing a normal
child to maturity is far less than when, to conserve family resources, the par-
ents sought unsuccessfully to avoid conceiving another child.6 8
Undertaking such a "motivational analysis" as the Burke court did,
is a far more sensible alternative than the "child-as-injury" ap-
64. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 258 n.11, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 n.11 (1971), leave
to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971).
65. Those opposed to abortion may take further comfort in one commentator's obser-
vation and suggestion that, "It]he defendant has the burden of demonstrating that
the plaintiffs' conduct was unreasonable; and in the wrongful birth case, the bur-
den should not be a light one." Note, supra note 63, at 1328.
66. See, eg., Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
67. The avoidable consequences doctrine has long been law in Nebraska. The
supreme court accepted the doctrine in Colton v. Benes, 176 Neb. 483, 126 N.W.2d
652 (1964), holding.
[O]ne injured by another's tort is required to exercise ordinary care to
seek medical or surgical treatment so as to effect a cure and minimize
damages, on pain of not being allowed [recovery] for consequences of the
injury which could have been averted by the exercise of such care.
Id. at 497, 126 N.W.2d at 661. Furthermore, both abortion and adoption are legal
alternatives to parenthood under Nebraska law. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-325 to
347 (Reissue 1989)(abortion); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-101 to 160 (Reissue
1988)(adoption). Therefore, for Nebraska courts to exclude an avoidable conse-
quences analysis when the doctrine has been long applied, and where abortion
and adoption are legal alternatives to parenthood, would be illogical under this
Note's analysis.
68. Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 772, 551 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1990)(citations omitted).
[Vol. 70:361
]WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
proach.6 9 One commentator insightfully reasoned that since tort law
is designed to compensate individuals for losses to legally recognized
interests, courts must determine the specific interests the parents
sought to protect through sterilization in order to assess appropriate
damages. While these interests might be quite diverse or varied, ig-
noring them would mean that the courts have not devoted proper at-
tention to why the sterilization operations were sought in the first
place.70 In other words,
Only after the motivation, the "why," has been discovered may the courts
properly determine "how much." Rather than taking the "child-as-injury" ap-
proach, then, is it suggested that application of a motivational analysis would
best clarify the interests the plaintiff sought to protect, and thereby allow
proper compensation for any injuries thereto.7 1
Thus, under a "motivational analysis," the inquiry focuses on the
costs of childbirth and raising the child, not the presence of the child
itself. As one court recognized, the parents seek damages because the
direct, foreseeable, and natural consequences of the physician's negli-
gence forced upon them the very burdens they sought to avoid
through sterilization. The parents do not want damages because they
do not love and want to keep the unplanned child.72
Courts have recognized three motives behind limiting the size of a
family: (1) therapeutic-to prevent harm to the mother's health;73 (2)
eugenic-to prevent the birth of a defective or unhealthy child;74 and
(3) socioeconomic-to avoid the additional expense of raising a child or
to avoid disruption of the parents' careers or lifestyles.7 5 Damage
awards may vary according to the reason or motive behind the sterili-
zation, and motives may be intertwined. For simplicity's sake, the dis-
cussion below keeps the motives separate.
69. Note, supra note 48, at 1169 (containing an in-depth discussion of the motivational
analysis).
70. Id. at 1170 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed.
1971)).
71. Id.
72. Jones v. Malinowski, 229 Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435-36 (1985).
73. See e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 73 IM. App. 3d 51, 53, 391 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1979); Christensen v.
Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 123, 255 N.W. 620, 621 (1934).
74. See, e.g., Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 254-55, 455 A.2d 883, 883-883 (1982);
Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 348 n.4, 408 A.2d 496, 499 n.4 (1979), ff'd,
497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
75. See e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 244, 187 N.W.2d 511, 512 (1971), leave
to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d
169, 171 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 74, 344 A.2d 336,
339 (1975); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 348 n.4, 408 A.2d 496, 499 n.4
(1979), aff'd, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
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A. Damages Permissible in a Therapeutic Context
Sterilization sought for therapeutic reasons is meant to protect the
physical or mental health of the patient or the spouse of the patient.
Thus, if the health of the woman is the only interest sought to be pro-
tected, the only forseaable injury was impairment of the woman's
health by pregnancy and childbirth.76 The California Court of Ap-
peals discussed therapeutic sterilization in Custodio v. Bauer.77 Ad-
dressing the question of whether to allow birth expenses, the court
stated:
The purpose of the operation was to save the wife from the hazards to her life
which were incident to childbirth. It was not the alleged purpose to save the
expense incident to pregnancy and delivery... The expenses alleged are
incident to the bearing of a child, and their avoidance is remote from the
avowed purpose of the operation.
78
Following Custodio's rational, damages for a negligent therapeutic
sterilization should be limited to the costs of the failed operation, com-
pensation for any injuries to the woman's health and possibly mental
anguish associated with the birth.79 The result is that the only costs
recoverable would be those the operation was designed to avoid in the
first place.
Application of the benefit rule8 0 and same interest limitation s ' in
the therapeutic context would be severely restricted. The damages re-
coverable in a wrongful pregnancy action prompted by a negligent
therapeutic sterilization would be limited to the cost of the operation,
both general and special damages related to any injury to the mother's
health as a result of pregnancy, and any mental anguish.8 2 Thus, any
offset by the benefit rule would be virtually non-existent. Under the
same interest limitation, the defendant's offset would be restricted to
any specific benefit bestowed on the mother's health as a result of the
pregnancy and childbirth, since that was the interest sought to be pro-
tected.83 Childrearing costs would not be recoverable, because they
were not costs sought to be avoided by the operation. However, if the
physician's negligence caused the mother some kind of disabling in-
jury such that she could not raise her children without special assist-
ance, then any "extraordinary" expenses associated with this special
76. Note, supra note 48, at 1190.
77. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See also Note, supra note 48, at 1190
(discussing Custodio).
78. Id. at 318, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (quoting Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123,
126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934)).
79. Note, supra note 48, at 1190-91.
80. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.




aid ought to be recoverable.84 In other words, the recovery should in-
clude the exra costs associated with raising the child, for example the
cost of a "nanny" or nurse, if, but only if, these extra costs flow from a
harm to the health of the mother.
Applying the avoidable consequences doctrine to the therapeutic
context, the physician might argue that the only amount recoverable
is the cost of the operation, since the fetus could have been aborted
immediately after pregnancy was discovered. Yet, because the ques-
tion is one of reasonableness and would involve different considera-
tions in every case, the answer might vary with different triers of fact.
Since, however, normal childrearing costs would generally not be re-
coverable in this situation, mitigation by abortion or adoption appears
an unlikely requirement.8 5
B. Damages Permissible in a Eugenic Context
Where a couple seeks sterilization for eugenic reasons, the inter-
ests sought to be protected are easily identifiable.8 6 Simply put, the
parents want to avoid the risk of giving birth to a defective or un-
healthy child and the emotional and pecuniary costs associated there-
with. Thus, unless the child is born unhealthy or defective, the
parents should be limited in their recovery to the cost of the negligent
operation and compensation for any "side effects." Additionally, re-
covery ought to be allowed for emotional distress until the parents
were, or can be, assured of the child's good health.87 No childrearing
expenses should be allowed if the child is in good health.
However, where a defective or unhealthy child is born as the result
of a negligent eugenic sterilization, the parents should be allowed to
recover substantial damages, in addition to pregnancy and birth-re-
lated costs, including damages for mental and emotional distress, and
extraordinary childrearing expenses.8 8 The parents' interest injured
by the physician's negligence is "the financial and emotional 'expense'
of raising and impaired child."89 Thus, since it is highly improbable
that the parents would realize a pecuniary benefit from the birth of a
defective or unhealthy child, "application of benefit rule would be lim-
ited to offsetting the post-birth 'rewards of parenthood' against the...
nonpecuniary damages for emotional distress and mental anguish."90
Furthermore, the physician might argue that the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine requires consideration of the abortion or adoption al-
84. Id. at 1191-92.
85. Id. at 1192.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1194.
88. Id. at 1192-93.




ternatives. Yet, as noted above, that is a reasonableness question for
the trier of fact which may vary with the particular case.
C. Damages Permissible in a Socioeconomic Context
The socioeconomic motivation behind a sterilization operation can
be divided into two main categories: "pure economic" and "socioeco-
nomic." 91 "Pure economic" may be the most common reason for un-
dergoing a sterilization operation.92 By doing so, the couple is simply
trying to avoid the financial hardshsips associated with having a child.
If economic considerations are the sole purpose force behind the ster-
ilization, arguably the parents deserve a liberal recovery of childrear-
ing expenses. The interest sought to be protected is purely pecuniary
in nature. Therefore, the parents should be awarded damages for all
provable financial injuries. A narrow interpretation of the benefit
rule's same interest limitation should be used so as to best compensate
the parents for their new and sudden financial burden, thrust upon
them by the physician's negligence. Thus, only economic benefits re-
ceived by the parents as a result of the child's birth should be consid-
ered in mitigation of damages. However, since the economic benefits a
child contributes to the family coffers are relatively few, any offset
allowed will likely have a negligible impact on the damage award.9s
The parents' motivation in seeking sterilization is most difficult to
ascertain in the "socioeconomic" cases. Here, the parents choose not
to have a child because it would burden their careers or lifestyle.94
Thus, since economic factors are not primarily the issue, the interests
involved are more non-pecuniary in nature. As such, damages should
be awarded for any injury to those non-pecuniary interests in addition
to the traditional pregnancy and birth-related expenses. Applying the
benefit rule, the trier of fact should offset the nonpecuniary damages
claimed by the plaintiff against the benefits of parenthood.95 Cer-
tainly such an offset could significantly reduce the plaintiff's recov-
ery,96 however it is clearly a fair result under the traditional tort
principles. Furthermore, childrearing expenses per se should not be
awarded where they were not sought to be avoided. If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff can prove one purpose for the operation was to
avoid childrearing costs, then such costs should be allowed.
91. Id. at 1194-95.
92. Id. at 1194.
93. Id at 1195 (footnote omitted). See also Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 187
N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971), leave to appeal denied, 385 Mich. 753 (1971)(stating there
is a growing recognition that the financial services parents can expect from off-
spring are largely illusory).
94. Note, supra note 48, at 1195.




It has been asserted that socioeconomic sterilizations present the
most difficult cases in which to apply the avoidable consequences doc-
trine, since neither the health of the mother nor that of the child is at
stake.97 However, since abortion and adoption are currently legal al-
ternatives in many jurisdictions, the trier of fact should consider them.
VII. CONCLUSION
In order that our tort law system functions in a just manner, courts
must recognize and consistently apply the principles on which the sys-
tem was founded. The benefit rule with its same interest limitation
and the avoidable consequences doctrine are fundamental parts of the
system. Furthermore, there exists the principle that a negligent
tortfeasor is liable for all of the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of his negligence. For courts to discard these traditional tort ideals in
the specific area of wrongful pregnancy would be for them to shut
their eyes to what a wrongful pregnancy case truly is-a medical mal-
practice action, which in turn is nothing other than a negligence claim.
A correct application of the benefit rule is important where courts
apply the rule to offset the plaintiff's damages. The same interest lim-
itation requires a determination of the interest sought to be protected
by the sterilization before any offset for benefits can be made against
the damage award.
Consideration of abortion and/or adoption as potential reducers of
the damage award, where they are legal choices, is essential under the
avoidable consequences doctrine. Clearly, the potential of a reduction
in a damage award because a plaintiff failed to abort her fetus is con-
troversial considering the debate over the propriety of abortions gen-
erally. However, because some states allow abortions it would be
illogical to ignore abortion as a factor in those jurisdictions. Further-
more, because the trier of fact will evaluate a choice not to abort under
a case-by-case reasonableness standard, those opposed to abortion will
have an opportunity to prove choosing abortion was unreasonable for
them.
The motivational analysis is the most effective way of determining
the interest sought to be protected. The three fundamental groups of
interests, therapeutic, eugenic, and socioeconomic, each require special
analyses to determine the types of awardable damages. The best case
for childrearing damages is in the "pure economic" context where the
parents' sole interest in sterilization was to keep from incurring the
expenses associated with raising a child.
The Burke opinion is certainly a step in the right direction in mak-
ing correct applications of the above described theories reality.




theories, its generally enlightened approach to the wrongful preg-
nancy cause of actions should be used to guide courts like Ne-
braska's,98 who have never considered a wrongful pregnancy claim.
Michael C. Pallesen '91
98. Nebraska courts must also correctly apply the provisions of the Nebraska Hospi-
tal-Medical Liability Act. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to 2855 (Reissue 1988). The
Act provides a one million dollar cap on medical malpractice damage awards pro-
vided the physician previously qualified to come under the scope of the Act, and
the patient did not elect to be outside the Act. However, the Act does not dictate
the types of damages recoverable. Thus, although a wrongful pregnancy plaintiff
could be limited to a one million dollar maximum recovery, the Act would not
prohibit part of that amount from being childrearing damages.
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